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Introduction
It has long been a central tenant of Tokugawa history that samurai fiefs "effectively" became defunct
during the 17th century. This typically is understood (in the English-language literature) as reflecting a tightening of
"central control" over divisive tendencies throughout the Tokugawa polity and an important step in achieving
political stability.
While it is undeniable that samurai fiefs underwent fundamental changes between the 16th and 17th
centuries, it is an overstatement to say that these disappeared from the Tokugawa political structure. Fiefs granted as
holdings in land are estimated to have existed in some 16% of all domains, accounting for some half of the
kokudaka ;p~ of the same.
Since the holders of the overwhelming majority of these fiefs did not hold full and independent rights of
administration, jurisdiction and taxation, their existence has often been dismissed as "insignificanL" This approach
tells us a lot about what the fief holders did not do: it tells.us nothing about what they did do. Yet trying to move
beyond this negative approach is difficult because we know so little about landed-fiefs in general. and what we do
know does not lend itself to generaIisation.
Notwithstanding how little we actually do know about landed-fiefs, there has been a change in emphasis in
scholarship within the last decade. This has come about from a growing realisation among some scholars that
despite landed-fiefs having been pronounced dead many times over, the institution did not disappear from the
Tokugawa Polity, and mo~over, that it continued to exercise a strong influence over the self-perceptions of samurai
of this period! This change in emphasis has yet to be accepted as the general consensus (the two "rising stars" of
generaIistic formulations about the Tokugawa Polity, Mizubayashi Takeshi 7J<:if:*~ and Kasaya Kazuhiko ~~~1t
-r!;, despite the considerable difference in their approach to describing the Tokugawa Polity, agree that landed-fiefs
are of no significance).2 yet recent developments in research suggest that there is a need to take another look at
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landed-fiefs. Studies of the Tokugawa Polity have moved beyond an economic detenninistic approach to take
account of such matters as sources of legitimacy, the role of the status system in determining samurai behaviour, and
to reconsider the earlier emphasis on the sole concentration of power in the hands of the upper echelons of society.
These new approaches are all especially relevant to thinking about landed-fiefs.
This paper will move beyond particularistic studies of individual fief systems to draw together a typology
of the variety between fief systems, and the points of convergence between the systems themselves and the logic
informing these systems to see what light newer approaches in scholarship may have to shed upon our understanding
of the samurai of the Tokugawa Period.
Landed-Fiefs: are they insignificant?
It bas long been one of the central tenets of Tokugawa Period history that landed-fiefs (~1;~fi$lJ) are
insignificant. Put simply, the argument that landed-fiefs are insignificant for anything but perhaps the first 50 years
or so of the Tokugawa period is based upon two sets of assertions.
The first set of assertions concerns the problem of how to define "insignificant" It is argued that even in
those domains which did retain the system of landed-fiefs throughout the Tokugawa Period, the institution had
become "fictionalised" (}f;lift) by the mid c 17th. The actual standard used to determine whether the fief system of
any particular domain had become "fictionalised" or not varies from scholar to scholar. Apart from Sasaki Junnosuke's
~k*.z.1t' gun'yaku ron .ti. which assumed that the primary function of landed-fiefs was to serve as a
vehicle for obtaining labour service from peasants for military service, most of the theories proposed for judging the
degree of "fictionalistion "of landed-fiefs depend upon measuring the perceived "realities" of mid- Tokugawa Period
landed-fiefs with some externally derived standard for defining "feudal lordship."
The standard most commonly applied is to see to what extent fief-holders held independent rights of
taxation, administration and jurisdiction. These three "rights" represent respectively: the right to extract surplus
product from the ruled as ground rent, control over the administrative apparatus necessary to maintain this on a
long-term basis, and command of the power of non-violent coercion necessary to ensure that rent is duly paid.
Together, these three rights effectively comprise the means of "extra-economic compulsion" (or "non-economic
compulsion") of the classic Marxist model of feudalism as a system of economic exploitation through class relations.
Leaving aside the question of whether one wishes to pursue a Marxist model or not. taken on its own terms, this
standard has many problems.
First of all, it is tied into 19th century notions of "feudalism." In particular, it assumes that "feudalism"
represented a state of either total anarchy (or something very close to this). This problem is related to another
shortcoming of this model, i.e. that taken on its own terms, it confuses the necessary conditions for procuring
surplus production with the actual process of procuring the same. These two problems are intertwined. Independent
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rights of taxation, administration and jurisdiction are originally rights that belong to the Swe: if these rights were
ever actually held fully by "independent feudal lords," then this would mean that an imponant part of State authority
had effectively disintegrated to the point of extinction, leaving nothing but a condition of anarchy. Rather than
accept the "all or nothing" approach implicit in the model presented. where State authority and the authority of
"feudal lords" are diametrically opposed to each other, it is both more realistic and historical to assume a relationship
between State authority and the authority of individual lords, where the relationship between the two is more
symbiOtic than oppositional. The rights of taXation. administtation and jurisdiction are concerned with the maintenance
of the overall social order and provide the framework within which individual lords collected surplus produce from
their fiefs. Put more simply, the problem of how to actually collect the surplus produce on one's lands is a
fundamentally different problem from such matters as bow to catch, try and punish a person for theft, for example. It
is highly questionable whether the model of feudalism implicit in this standard ever existed anywhere, but the
historical bankruptcy of this model becomes clear when we apply it to the formation of the Tokugawa Polity.
Perhaps the single most dominant theme in research within Japan into the formation of the Tokugawa
Polity over the past twenty years bas been the focus on the grounds for the legitimKY of the national government
and its acquisition of State powers. While there is considerable difference in the emphasis placed on the relative
importance of the role of the social roots of legitimacy and its roots in pre-existing State organs, there is at least
general agreement that legitimacy within the Tokugawa Polity did not come simply from the acquisition of lands
and power by the various hegemons. If we no longer expect the national government of the Tokugawa State to
create its own legitimacy out of nothing, then why should we expect lesser lords to exist within the artificial v~uum
required by the definition of an "independent feudal lord" that has been applied to date?
The third problem with the aforementioned definition of "significant" rights of rule concerns the focus
implicit within the definition on rule as being essentially coercive in nature. Few scholars today would depict the
Tokugawa Polity as deriving its legitimacy solely from the coercive powers at its disposal. Yet the trinity of "full
and independent rights of taxation, administration and jurisdiction" (as conceived within the original definition at
least) is essentially a combination of nonviolent coercive forces and instruments thereof to acquire surplus production
from the producer. Yet if the higher levels of authority within the Tokugawa Polity derived their legitimacy from
sources other than their own innate powers of coercion, violent or otherwise, should not authority or rule at lower
levels also be considered in terms other than the coercive powers available to lords at these levels? Earlier studies of
landed-fiefs have made it clear that there was a significant decline in the powers available to fief-holders in the
formative stages of the Tokugawa Polity, but these studies are less infonnative when it comes to questions concerning
the possible sources of legitimacy of fief-holders and explanations relevant to those regions where the landed-fief
system did not disappear..
If the definition of "significant" rights of rule for fief-holders is of questionable applicability, then the
problem of how prevalent the system of granting landed.fiefs was within the Tokugawa Polity is also less clear than
generally assumed. Despite the inherent unreliability of any "guestimate" of the number of Ban retaining the system
of granting landed-fiefs, there is no question that their number was small: a figure of less than 20%, quite possibly
closer to 10%, is probably not too inaccurate. It is also clear that while the number of Han retaining this system was
small overall. they were mostly the larger Ban, and therefore accounted for a considerable ponion of the Tokugawa
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polity. possibly as much as half overall measured in terDlS of kokudaka. 3 The main problem with this figure is not so
much its inherent inaccuracy. but rather the problem of defining what constitutes a landed-fief system.
The single largest problem here is whether it is correct to limit the scope of the problem to that of Man.
Scholars worlcing on the Tokugawa Bakufu, both its political structure and matters related to local control on
"Bakufu" lands, have always considered hatamoto fiefs to be "landed-fiefs." either subject to the same forces
leading to their "fictionalisation" as in daimyo domains, or otherwise, depending on the individual scholar's stance.
If one adds hatamoto to the category of landed-fiefs in general, then the figures given above for the prevalence of the
system throughout the Tokugawa Polity lose a lot of their meaning, as the vast Tokugawa lands must thereby be
added to the area wherein the landed-fief system prevailed. One of the more important results to be gained from this
change in perspective is that it ~leases us from the sterile argument that landed-fiefs systems continued to exist only
in the more peripheral and "backward» areas of Japan. Hatamoto fiefs existed not only throughout the Kanto Plain
around Edo. but more importantly, in the "advanced" areas around Osaka as well.
Defining "landed-fiefs"
Landed-fiefs have figured prominently in explanations of the formation of d1e Tokugawa Polity, albeit it
d1e sense that their demise, or the general restriction of the rights of rule of die fief-holders, has generally been taken
to represent one of the major changes occurring in the formative stages of the Tokugawa Polity. Yet, notwithstanding
the regularity to which it is referred to, no adequate definition of this institution exists. The very variety of the
institution is part of the explanation for this state of affairs, but another aspect of this problem bas been that the
unrealistic definition of "significant rights of rule" applied so far has stifled attempts to move towards a more
realistic appraisal. Two attempts to define landed-fiefs based on an analysis of existing fief systems have been made
to date .
3) The figure most commonly used for the number of Han retaining the landed-fief system is 16 to
17% by the last decade of the 17th Century (Kanai Madoka ~;1t:. r.8I1.At.::itMO)iJf~J (sJII~.xti,
1975~, IS:', .lft) ). A more faithful recompilation of the source for this figure made by Fujii JOji is given in
the table below a:Jt._.= r"~.~J (rB*~a~J 139-140, 197~, 161.) . The tWo types of
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Morris (1988) f~ 00 collecting ~gu~. (and the varioos suppl~ntary services) as the distinguishing
feature of a viable landed-fief system. In Morris's argument, a fief-holder's right to the fief sprang from the act of
enfeoffment by the granter of the fief. This is a statement of the obvious. but it also draws attention to the fact that
the legal basis for the fief-holder's control over the fief existed within a larger framewm or hierarchy of rule. As
legal entities, landed-fiefs did not exist in opposition to higher authority, but were its creation, and therefore the
rights of such fief-holders existed as a sub-set of the creating authority Moreover. collecting nengu meant that the
fief-holder dlereby incurred responsibility for the welfare of the cultivator(s) of his fief-land, entering into a contract
of mutual obligation and responsibility of the sort that marked seigneurial rule generally in the Tokugawa State.
Within this general definition of Ianded- fiefs. Morris distinguishes three categories of fiefs. These were: (I) "special
fiefs" where the holder was entrusted with some of the higher powers of public authority in addition to the right to
collect nengu, (2) "ordinary fiefs" where the holder was essentially enttUSted with collecting nengu. and (3) fiefs
granted to the holder without any cultivator attached to the land, and which the holder was expected to cultivate
himself. These three types of fiefs were granted in conespondence with the status of the holder: type (1) special fiefs
were restricted to high-ranking daimyo vassals, while type (3) fiefs were granted to low-ranking retainers and
rear-vassals. Thus in Morris's formulation, the rights of the fief-holder were related to the relative status of that
person within the overall status hierarchy.4
Takano (1995) bases his definition of kyu~n ryoJ.1Shu ~A.~) on the larger daimyo retainers who
retained rights of administration and jurisdiction as well tax collection over their fiefs. In Takano's opinion, these
larger fief-holders should be considered to represent the defining standard for daimyo retainers, because their
powers of rule both came closer to representing the daimyo model, and because they were in a position to conduct
the traditional religious rites deemed necessary to support agricultural activities. These rites date back to the
Ritsury~ Code of Ancient Japan. and were carried on as the sankaj~ DO kissho r.=. Jr.-1i. J conducted by the
Kamakura and Muromachi Bakufu. and by the local lords (t£_.~) of these two periods.
These two attempts to redefine landed-fiefs are complementary. despite initial appearances to the contrary.
Takano does not intend to imply that fief-holders who did not hold powers other than the right to collect Dengu are
insignificant: his emphasis on the fact that there were daimyo retainers who did exercise rights other than tax
collection is to highlight that such fief-holders could and did exist within the Bakuhan System. In Takano's opinion,
this form of fief-bolding by larger retainers represented the ideal rather than the average form of fief-holding.
Takano's argument is also important in pointing towards sources of legitimacy based in traditional ideas about the
4) High-ranking vassals did not simply hold larger fiefs; they could serve as substitutes for the
daimyo himself in perfonning service for the Bakufu when the daimyo was incapacitated, received court titles, and
were allowed audiences with the Shogun (e.g. Sendai Han). This kind of large vassal should be seen as constituting
part of the .~. of their ban. On the other band, granting fiefs to footsoldiers (~:t) and asbigaru (JE;&)
without a cultivator attached to the land given is commonly understood as meaning that the fief-holder cultivated the
fief himself. In reality, the fief-holder may have rented the land out to peasants, but in this case he collected rent
under a private contract, and not as nengu, which is a public not a private duty. Granting land without a cultivator
meant that these fief-holders of lower status were excluded from exercising the public right of collecting nengu.
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obligations beholding a "lord," independent of any deed of superior authority towards the fief-holder. On the other
hand, since Morris defmes collecting nengu as involving the obligation to support the cultivator of fief land, this
suggests that even those smaller fief-holders who did not have the resources that Takano's kyUJLnin ry~hu had
available to them to provide both material and spiritual support, in principle at least incurred a duty to provide the
material support necessary for their cultivators to avoid being driven off their land. This is a less ethereal way of
suggesting the social basis of legitimacy for fief rule that Takano argues for in his emphasis on the riblal aspects of
legitimate rule. Both scholars agree that whatever was the formal legal definition of the content of any particular
fief, there was a large element of case-by-case negotiation between fief-holder and cultivators in detennining the
actual content of what transpired on the fief.
One other aspect of Takano's formulation of landed-fiefs is his emphasis on the role of the fief as
providing the material basis for supporting the ie (~, -{;1:.) = patrimony (7) of daimyo retainers. This is a rather
complicated concept. At the most basic level, the fief provided income for the holder and his household. However,
this income was not realised in simply economic terms. The ie of the fief-holder extended to include not only the
immediate family of the fief-holder and his vassals, but also the commoners resident on the fief and the physical
attributes of the fief, including the produce of the area. In Takano's studies of large fief-holders in Saga Han,
KyuJ.1ShuJ.1, this communality was expressed in a regular cycle of ritual covering both the annual cycle of the
seasons, and the life cycle of the fief-holder. This cycle of ritual differed for vassals of the fief-holder and for
commoners, but at important points throughout the annual riblal cycle the fief-holder and his vassals participated
with the commoners on the fief in praying for good harvests, and celebrating the fruits thereof.
Furthermore, focusing on the fief and its role in supporting the ie of the holder leads into another aspect of
landed-fiefs that has been neglected to date, i.e. what was the defining char~teristic of a samurai in the Tokugawa
Period that separated a samurai from other lower-ranking members of bushi status. A textbook answer to this
question would focus on such aspects as whether the person in question was allowed to wear two swords, use a
surname, and other external signs of samurai status. For contemporary thinkers such as OgyuJ.L Sorai ii~m ~
Dazai Shundai .*$:0:-&. and Fujita ToJ.Lko.m.~. dlough, in addition to these visible signs, a "true" samurai
was a person who received land in fief and collected nengu; any other samurai was not to be properly trusted
(Takano 1996, p. 330-1 ). The concern of contemporaries with maintaining some kind of link between samurai and
"rule" of the land suggests why in many domains the system of allotting lands and cultivators to daimyo retainers
was maintained despite the fact that these retainers no longer actually collected their own nengu from these nominal
fiefs. Early postwar scholarship under the influence of Ito TasaburoJ.Lft.~=.. saw a clear trend in 17th century
Japanese history towards the abolition of landed-fiefs and the adoption of stipends (--$11) instead of landed-fiefs.
However, in retrospect, what is striking about the Tokugawa fief system is not just that the rights of rule over fiefs
held by daimyo retainers were markedly reduced (if not totally eliminated) in many han in the first half of the 17th
century, but that despite the clear trend towards curtailment of rights of rule, many han still clung to the outward
forms of a landed-fief system. Not only did landed-fiefs not disappear in some ban, but in other ban considerable
attention was devoted to maintaining the appearances of the system despite the fact that it no longer served any
obvious purpose. This seeming irrationality in clinging to what to all intents and purposes had become a paper
fomlality in many domains needs to be understood in temlS of what these fiefs meant to contemporaries. as being
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one of the hallmarks of a "ttQe" samurai. The central importance of the landed-fief in defining dle samurai self-image
helps explain why some ban did not abolish dle system landed-fiefs, and why many odlers insisted in maintaining
the appearances of a landed-fief system even though fief..holders did not collect any dues from their fiefs. Despite
the interpretative importance given by scholars to the stipend system as the evolutionary successor to the landed-fief,
for contemporaries, a stipend was a simply a sign of inferior status, and definitely not a step up any evolutionary
ladder. It has long been recognised that there is no clear dividing line between landed-fiefs and nominal fiefs <::e.*
~fi) and that they represent a continuum on a sliding scale of degrees (Suzuki Hisashi Y;;*8). To date, scholars
have tended to emphasise nominal fiefs as representing the more important part of this sliding scale, but the very
fact that nominal fief systems could not do away with the residual aspects of landed fiefs (parceling out land and/or
cultivators when awarding fiefs) suggests that the significance of the ideal of ruling a fief outweighed the actual
realities of Tokugawa seigneuriallandholding.
Our attempt to define landed-fiefs has been rather self-defeating, so far as arriving at a precise definition
which enables us to move on to analysis of specific problems. Perhaps the most productive way to handle this state
of affairs to accept this vagueness as part of the definition. Replacing the old sterile and limiting definition of an
ideal type of "feudal lord" as representing the only meaningful type of fief widl another limited definition will create
more problems than it solves. The best compromise is to look for those paramettes which mark off the outer limits
of d1e subject
At the most basic level, a landed-fief is a fief where the deed of enfeoffment (and accompanying supplementary
documents) list the actual location of fief land by county, village, and plot of land as marked on the cadastral survey
registers, and the nominal cultivator of each plot of land listed. Under this definition, nominal fiefs (8;*;Iifi) are
also landed-fiefs, in intention, if nothing else. The most basic form of a landed-fief system where the holder still
retained some meaningful rights of rule would be a system where the holder collected nengu directly from the fief.
In this case, the right to "rule" the fief would derive from two sources: the act of investure of the fief from a higher
authority, and from the traditional relationship between ruler and ruled that still continued to persist throughout the
Tokugawa Period. This latter source of legitimacy was closely related to the nature of control or "rule" exercised by
the fief-holder over the fief being done so within the framework of the ie of the fief-holder. To see how this
description (rather than definition) of landed-fiefs worked in reality, I would like to take a brief look at some actual
examples of different fief systems.
Different types of landed-fiefs
1) Noorinalised fiefs:
Okayama Ran: Tozama, 315,(MX) koku, Ikeda Family. a famous case of a nominalised fief system (Taniguchi).
From the mid-c 17th (~Jl;. 2lf.) the han decided the rate of taxation for each village as a unit. Fief-holders only
collected nengu from their fief at the rate decided by the ban in proportion to their holding in each village (note: they
did not collect nengu from the han granaries, but were paid directly by the cultivators). Han assumed responsibility
for providing assistance for impoverished and distressed peasants. BUT cultivators within the village were still
divided up and assigned to fief-holders as subject to COrvee service <R~). Permission from the fief-holder was
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necessary for a "fief' peasant (or family member) to change place of residence to another village. Woodlands could
be assigned to fief-holders. Fief-holders could induce the peasants assigned to them to provide loans (Taniguchi p.
99).
This case suggests that despite the weakness of formal control of the fief-bolder over the fief, and in
particular the fact that the ban bad assumed responsibility for maintaining the peasants on all fief-land (i.e. the social
basis of indeperKlent legitimacy for fief rule a 1a Taboo), the very fact of the existeDce of eveD Domina! formalliDks
o.<t..t~
(in this case, B~7t) between fief-holder and peasants could lead to stronger social links forming between the two
e.g. loans to the fief-bolder. This points out the gap between formal limitations and existing real relationships
between ruler and ruled.
Yonezawa Han: Tozama. ISO,<XX> tom. Uesugi Family. Anotbec classic case of a "nominalised" landed-fief
system (Hanseishi Kenk:yuJ1kai). NotWithstanding, retainers still were able to collect non-rice agricultural products
(e.g. vegetable oil, straw) at determined rates from the fief. Peasants badly in arrears in payments of nengu could be
f<X'Ced to provide a "hostage" to pay off the amount due with labour service (Watanabe Fumio).
Suggests the importance of landed-fiefs as providing not just income (rice), but also various items of
consumption to support the economy of die fief-holder. Also, large numbers ofbotb direct retainen and rear-vassals
in Yonezawa were granted fief land without cultivators. This phenomenon is commonly connected to the history of
Yonezawa of suffering beiDg reduced to almost 10% of its original size between 160 I and 1662. There is a need to
explain why both the ban and its larger retainers did not cut their vassal numbers in accordance with this drastic
reduction in holdings.
Kaga Han: Tozama, l,<XX>,<XX> koku, Maeda Family. Another classic case of a "nominalised" fief system.
Could someone explain how the Maeda manaaed to implement a landed-fief here in the first place, since the Maeda
did not/could not conduct plot-by-plot surveys of their land to begin with. F.Urthennore, all that bas been written
about nominalisation of fiefs in Kaga is concerned with questions of the exercise of power and the subsequent
restriction of such powers after the implementation of the Kaisak.uho~ ~fr:~. Could anyone tell us (I) who
collected nengu from fief-land, and (2) how the rice collected as such was either passed on to fief-holders, or
marketed and the returns of the sales of such passed on, and (3) how the implementation of the Kaisak.uho~ reforms
affected this situation?
2) Fiefs with control of both land and cultivator:
Nagoya HaD (619.500 kaku, GosaDke, Tokugawa) and Nanbu HaD (100,<XX> koku, Tozama. Nanbu Family):
Putting d1ese two ban together is close to blasphemy, Nanbu HaD supposedly representing the most "backward" and
"exceptional" part of the dark and benighted To~ku Region. However, these two fiefs systems have much in
common. In particular, in both systems, fief holders not only collected nengu themselves, they also were responsible
for drawing up the temple registelS *Mat:. for the peasants on their fiefs. In both domains, fief-holders exercised
more rights over the person of the peasants attached to their fiefs than is usual elsewhere. The legal basis for d1is
control would have been the fact that they drew up the temple registers for their fiefs. These two han also share a
similarity in the relationship between the daimyo and his retainers. In both domains, the core of the vassal band was
comprised of local warriors who had control of their own local areas prior to the arrival of the daimyo (or the
~
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extension of his rule to dJeir local area). Suggests that the specific fonn that fief-holding takes is an expression of the
relationship between the daimyo and his vassals, as well as between the vassal and the peasants cultivating fief land.
This type of fief in Nagoya and Nanbu is probably different from fiefs where a division of cultivators
between fief-holders (a~'Jt) such as was conducted in Okayama. The important distinguishing feature is who
drew up the temple register. That retainers in these two ban drew up the registers suggests that they participated in
the exercise of powers nonnally associated with the State's powers of maintaining public order, rather than those
powers directly concerned with con~on ofnengu (Itot1 Takayuki-Dt"-'$. and Morris Chap. 8).
3) Fiefs with control of land alone
Sendai Han, 620,<XXI kob, Tozama. Dare Family. It was from a stUdy of this ban that M<Xris arrived at his
division of landed-fiefs into the three categories mentioned above. The right of retainen holding nonna! type (2)
fiefs were essentially restricted to collecting nengu and .ti according to a formula set by the ban. In type (I)
special fiefs, fief-holders exel'cised a wider variety of rights of control, but these should be properly understood as
representing a division of the powen of State rule exercised by the daimyo, rather than a breakdown or misfunction
of Han control. Sendai Han is also distinguished by the large number of rear-vassals, many of whom engaged in
cultivation of their fiefs. This phenomenon leads to questions as to who was a hyakusho~ e~ and who was a
member of the bushi status group, and who determined who had what status. Looking at the way status was
detemlined aDd maintained suggests that retainen played an important role in detennining this within their fiefs.
Many fiefs in Sendai were either largely or in part composed of land that the fief-holder bad reclaimed
through opening up waste land Jfm~~. This has been undentood as due to Sendai having a disproportionately
large vassal band like Yonezawa, but this is putting the cart before the h<Xse, as the vassal band actually expanded
considerably in the first half of the c 17th. This means that the "over-sized" Sendai vassal band grew with the surge
in land reclamation, and therefore could not have been the initial cause of this surge. Seigneurial land-holding is
Japan is distinguished by the fact that (theoretically) there was no private ownership of land by the ruling class. This
meant that all land held by the ruling class was held as a fief granted from a higher authority. This characteristic of
sicgneurialland-holding provided the basis for the much-purported "concentration" of all land-holding in the bands
of the Shogun. h needs to be borne in mind. however, that the Shogun himself no more held any private lands than
the lowest-ranking samurai, and that the underlying principle that gave the Shogun such wide-ranging powers of
control over seigneuria1land-holding actually affected the Shogun. himself too. There was only possible exception
to this principle. and that was on the part of the lowest -ranking samurai, not the Shogun. The closest thing to
privately-held land in Tokugawa Japan was land that the owner had reclaimed, and held either as fief or as a
f'"'<\.,t~*A
cultivator, re~8U J in Sendai terminology. One totally unexplored aspect of fiefs in Sendai is the possiblity that
there was a mm-ging CK blurring of the line betWeen private and public holding of land. and that this bad an important
formative affect on the development of the fief system within this domain.
26 Early Modern Japan Volume 6 Number 1
Concluding Remarks
This paper has been more speculative than analytical, and does not lend itself readily to a neat conclusion
or summary. The basic theme should be rather self.obvious: that if we move beyond a economic-determinist
approach to Tokugawa history, and start looking at such themes as the role of status and family systems in shaping
the Tokugawa Polity, the role of the State and State authority, the tension between legal (Statist) sources of
legitimacy and social sources of the same, then the role of landed-fiefs as playing an important ,-ole in determining
the basic nature of Tokugawa Period samurai assumes a new importance. There are still a number of related aspects
of the problem to which I have not had time to even hint at yet which are inter-connected in important ways with the
nature of the Tokugawa samurai and land-holding. Rather than further confuse the issue, I will leave these until a
later date.
This brief outline of landed-fiefs will probably not convince most of you the need to start revising your
general introduction to Tokugawa Japan courses. At best I hope that it may help to make you a little more receptive
to alternative approaches to analysing the power structures of the Tokugawa Polity, and the logic informing these
structures.
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